In this paper, we study proximal type dynamics in the context of noncooperative multi-agent network games. These dynamics arise in different applications, since they describe distributed decision making in multi-agent networks, e.g., in opinion dynamics, distributed model fitting and network information fusion, where the goal of each agent is to seek an equilibrium using local information only. We analyse several conjugations of this class of games, providing convergence results, or designing equilibrium seeking algorithms when the original dynamics fail to converge. For the games subject only to local constraints we look into both synchronous/asynchronous dynamics and time-varying communication networks. For games subject in addition to coupling constraints, we design an equilibrium seeking algorithm converging to a special class of game equilibria. Finally, we validate the theoretical results via numerical simulations on opinion dynamics and distributed model fitting.
I. INTRODUCTION

A. Motivation: Multi-agent decision making over networks
Multi-agent decision making over networks is currently a vibrant research area in the systems-and-control community, with applications in several relevant domains, such as smart grids [1] , [2] , traffic and information networks [3] , social networks [4] , [5] , consensus and flocking groups [6] and robotic [7] and sensor networks [8] , [9] . The main benefit that each decision maker, in short, agent, achieves from the use of a distributed computation and communication, is to keep its own data private and to exchange information with selected agents only. Essentially, in networked multi-agent systems, the states (or the decisions) of each agent evolve as a result of local decision making, e.g. local constrained optimization, and distributed communication with some neighboring agents, via a communication network, usually modelled by a graph. Usually, the aim of the agents is to reach a collective equilibrium state, where no one can benefit from changing its state at that equilibrium. N i=1 Ω i . Given two vectors x, y ∈ R n and a symmetric and positive definite matrix Q 0, the weighted inner product and norm are denoted by x | y Q and x Q , respectively; the Q−induced matrix norm is denoted by A Q . A real n dimensional Hilbert space obtained by endowing H = (R n , · ) with the product x | y Q is denoted by H Q .
B. Operator-theoretic notations and definitions
The identity operator is defined by Id(·). The indicator function ι C : R n → [0, +∞] of C ⊆ R n is defined as ι C (x) = 0 if x ∈ C; +∞ otherwise. The set valued mapping N C : R n ⇒ R n stands for the normal cone to the set C ⊆ R n , that is N C (x) = {u ∈ R n | sup C − x, u ≤ 0} if x ∈ C and ∅ otherwise. The graph of a set valued mapping A : X ⇒ Y is gra(A) := {(x, u) ∈ X × Y | u ∈ A(x)}.
For a function φ : R n → R, define dom(φ) := {x ∈ R n |f (x) < +∞} and its subdifferential set-valued mapping, ∂φ : dom(φ) ⇒ R n , ∂φ(x) := {u ∈ R n | y − x|u + φ(x) ≤ φ(y) , ∀y ∈ dom(φ)}. The projection operator over a closed set S ⊆ R n is proj S (x) : R n → S and it is defined as proj S (x) := argmin y∈S y − x 2 . The proximal operator prox f (x) : R n → dom(f ) is defined by prox f (x) := argmin y∈R n f (y) + 1 2 x − y 2 . A set valued mapping F : R n ⇒ R n is -Lipschitz continuous with > 0, if u − v ≤ x − y for all (x, u) , (y, v) ∈ gra(F); F is (strictly) monotone if for all (x, u), (y, v) ∈ gra(F) u − v, x − y ≥ (>)0 holds, and maximally monotone if it there is no monotone operator with a graph that strictly contains gra(F); F is α-strongly monotone if for all (x, u), (y, v) ∈ gra(F) it holds x − y, u − v ≥ α x − y 2 . J F := (Id + F) −1 denotes the resolvent mapping of F. fix(A) := {x ∈ R n | x ∈ F(x)} and zer(F) := {x ∈ R n | 0 ∈ F(x)} denote the set of fixed points and zeros of F, respectively. The operator A : 
III. MATHEMATICAL SETUP AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider a set of N agents (or players), where the state (or strategy) of each agent i ∈ N := {1, . . . , N } is denoted by x i ∈ Ω i ⊂ R n . The set Ω i represents all the feasible states of agent i, hence it is used to model the local constraints of each agent. Throughout the paper, we assume compactness and convexity of the local constraint set Ω i .
Standing Assumption 1 (Convexity): For each i ∈ N , the set Ω i ⊂ R n is non-empty, compact and convex.
We consider rational (or myopic) agents, namely, each agent i aims at minimizing a local cost function g i , that we assume convex and with the following structure.
Standing Assumption 2 (Proximal cost functions): For each i ∈ N , the strictly-convex function g i : R n × R n → R is defined by
wheref i := f i + ι Ωi : R n → R is a lower semi-continuous and convex function.
We emphasize that Standing Assumption 2 requires neither the differentiability of the local cost function, nor the Lipschitz continuity and boundedness of its gradient. In (1) , the functionf i is local to agent i and models the local objective that the player would pursue if no coupling between agents is present. The quadratic term 1 2 x i −z 2 penalizes the distance between the state of agent i and a given z. This term is referred to the literature as regularization (see [17, Ch. 27] ), since it leads to a strictly convex g i , even though the f i is only lower semi-continuous, see [17, Th. 27.23] .
We assume that the agents can communicate through a network structure, described by a weighted digraph. Let us represent the communication links between the agents by a weighted adjacency matrix A ∈ R N ×N defined as [A] ij := a i,j . For all i, j ∈ N , a i,j ∈ [0, 1] denotes the weight that agent i assigns to the state of agent j. If a i,j = 0, then the state of agent i is independent from that of agent j. The set of agents with whom agent i communicates is denoted by N i . The following assumption formalizes the communication network via a digraph and the associated adjacency matrix.
Standing Assumption 3 (row stochasticity and self-loops): The communication graph is strongly connected. The matrix A = [a i,j ] is row stochastic, i.e., a i,j ≥ 0 for all i, j ∈ N , and N j=1 a i,j = 1, for all i ∈ N . Moreover, A has strictlypositive diagonal elements, i.e., min i∈N a i,i =: a > 0.
In our setup, the variable z in (1) represents the average state among the neighbors of agent i, weighted through the adjacency matrix, i.e., z := N j=1 a i,j x j . Therefore the cost function of agent i is g i y, N j=1 a i,j x j . Note that a coupling between the agents emerges in the local cost function, due to the dependence on the other agents strategy. The problem just described can be naturally formalized as a noncooperative network game between the N players, i.e., ∀i ∈ N :
We consider rational agents that, at each time instant k ∈ N, given the states of the neighbors, update their states/strategies according to the following myopic dynamics:
These dynamics are relatively simple, yet arise in diverse research areas. Next, we recall some papers in the literature where the dynamics studied are a special case of (3). 1) Opinion dynamics: In [18] , the authors study the Friedkin-Johnsen model, that is an extension of the DeGroot's model [19] . The update rule in [18, Eq. 1] is effectively the best response of a game with cost functions equal to
represents the stubbornness of the player. Thus, [18, Eq. 1] is a special case of (3). 2) Distributed model fitting: One of the most common tasks in machine learning is model fitting and in fact several algorithms are proposed in literature, e.g. [20] , [21] . The idea is to identify the parameters x of a linear model Ax = b, where A and b are obtained via experimental data. If there is a large number of data, i.e., A is a tall matrix, then the distributed counterpart of these algorithms are presented in [22, Sec. 8.2] . In particular, [22, Eq. 8.3] can be rewritten as a constrained version of (3). The cost function is defined by
where A i and b i represent the i-th block of available data,and x i is the local estimation of the parameters of the model. Here, i is a loss function and r is the regularization function r(z) := 1 2 x i − z . Finally, the arising game is subject to the constraint that at the equilibrium x i = x j for all i ∈ N . In Section VI-C, we describe in detailed a possible implementation of this type of algorithms.
3) Constrained consensus: if the cost function of the game in (3) is chosen with f i = 0 for all i ∈ N , then we retrive the projected consensus algorithm studied in [10, Eq. 3] to solve the problem of constrained consensus. To achieve the convergence to the consensus, it is required the additional assumption that int(∩ i∈N Ω i ) = ∅, see [10, Ass. 1].
Next, we introduce the concept of equilibrium of interest in this paper. Informally, we say that a collective vectorx ∈ Ω := N i=1 Ω i is an equilibrium of the dynamics (3) of the game in (2), if no agent i can decrease its local cost function by unilaterally changing its strategy with another feasible one. We formalize this concept in the following definition.
We note that if there are no self loops in the adjacency matrix, i.e., a i,i = 0 for all i ∈ N , then an NWE corresponds to a Nash equilibrium [2, Remark 1].
In the next section, we study the convergence of the dynamics in (3) to an NWE for a population of myopic agents. In particular, when the dynamics do not converge, we propose alternative ones to recover convergence.
IV. PROXIMAL DYNAMICS
In this section, we study three different types of unconstrained proximal dynamics, namely synchronous, asynchronous and time-varying. While for the former two, we can study and prove convergence to an NWE, the last does not ensure convergence. Thus, we propose a modified version of the dynamics with the same equilibria of the original game.
A. Unconstrained dynamics
As a first step, we rephrase the dynamics in a more compact form by means of the proximity operator. In fact, the dynamics in (3), with cost function as in (1) , are equivalent to the following proximal dynamics: for all i ∈ N ,
In compact form, they read as
where the matrix A := A ⊗ I n represents the interactions among agents, and the mapping prox f is a block-diagonal proximal operator, i.e.,
Remark 1: The definition of NWE can be equivalently recast as a fixed point of the operator (7) . In fact, a collective vector x is an NWE if and only if x ∈ fix(prox f •A). Under Assumptions 1 and 2, fix prox f • A is non-empty [23, Th. 4.1.5], i.e., there always exists an NWE of the game, thus the convergence problem is well posed.
The following lemma represents the cornerstone used to prove the convergence of the dynamics in (7) to an NWE. In particular, it shows that a row stochastic matrix A is an AVG operator in the Hilbert space weighted by a diagonal matrix Q, whose diagonal entries are the elements of the left Perron-Frobenius (PF) eigenvector of A, i.e., a vectorq ∈ R N >0 s.t.q A =q . In the remainder of the paper, we always consider the normalized PF eigenvector, i.e., q =q/ q .
Lemma 1 (Averageness and left PF eigenvector):
Let Assumption 3 hold true, i.e, A be row stochastic, a > 0 be its smallest diagonal element and q = col(q 1 , . . . , q N ) denotes its left PF eigenvector. Then, the following hold: Now, we are ready to present the first result, namely, the global convergence of the proximal dynamics in (7) to an NWE of the game in (2).
Theorem 1 (Convergence of proximal dynamics):
For any x(0) ∈ Ω, the sequence (x(k)) k∈N generated by the proximal dynamics in (7) converges to an NWE of (2).
Proof: See Appendix A. Remark 3: In [2, Sec. VIII-A.] the authors study, via simulations, an application of the game in (2) to opinion dynamics. In particular, they conjecture the convergence of the dynamics in the case of a row stochastic weighted adjacency matrix. Theorem 1 theoretically supports the convergence of this class of dynamics.
The presence of self-loops in the communication (Assumption 3) is critical for the convergence of the dynamics in (7) . Next, we present a simple example of a two player game, in which the dynamics fail to converge due to the lack of self-loops.
Example 1: Consider the two player game, in which the state of each agent is scalar andf i := ι Ω , for i = 1, 2. The set Ω is an arbitrarily big compact subset of R, in which the dynamics of the agents are invariant. The communication network is described by the doubly-stochastic adjacency matrix A = [ 0 1
1 0 ], defining a strongly connected graph without self-loops. In this example, the dynamics in (7) reduce to x(k + 1) = Ax(k). Hence, convergence does not take place for all x(0) ∈ Ω.
If a = 0, i.e., the self-loop requirement in Standing Assumption 3 is not satisfied, then the convergence can be restored by relaxing the dynamics in (3) via the so-called Krasnoselskii iteration [24, Sec. 5.2],
where α ∈ (0, 1). These new dynamics share the same fixed points of (7) , that correspond to NWE of the original game in (2). Corollary 1: For any x(0) ∈ Ω and for min i∈N a i,i ≥ 0, the sequence (x(k)) k∈N generated by the dynamics in (9) converges to an NWE of (3).
Proof: See Appendix A.
B. Asynchronous unconstrained dynamics
The dynamics introduced in (7) assume that all the agents update their strategy synchronously. Here, we study the more realistic case in which the agents behave asynchronously, namely, perform their local updates at different time instants. Thus, at each time instant k, only one agent i k ∈ N updates its state according to (6) , while the others do not, i.e.,
Next, we derive a compact form for the dynamics above. Define H i as the matrix of all zeros except for [H i ] ii = 1, and also H i := H i ⊗ I n . Then, we define the set H := {H i } i∈N as a collection of these N matrices. At each time instant k ∈ N, the choice of an agent which performs the update is modelled via an i.i.d. random variable ζ k , taking values in H. If ζ k = H i , it means that agent i updates at time k, while the others do not change their strategies. Given a discrete probability distribution (p 1 , . . . , p N ), we define P[ζ k = H i ] = p i , for all i ∈ N . With this notation in mind, the dynamics in (7) are modified to model asynchronous updates,
We remark that (11) represent the natural asynchronous counterpart of the ones in (7) . In fact, the update above is equivalent to the one in (6) for the active agent at time k ∈ N.
Hereafter, we assume that each agent i ∈ N has a public and private memory. If the player is not performing an update, the strategies stored in the two memories coincide. During an update, instead, the public memory stores the strategy of the agent before the update has started, while in the private one there is the value that is modified during the computations. When the update is completed, the value in the public memory is overwritten by the private one. This assumption ensures that all the reads of the public memory of each agent i, performed by each neighbor j ∈ N i , are always consistent, see [25, Sec. 1.2] for technical details.
We consider the case in which the computation time for the update is not negligible, therefore the strategies that agent i reads from each neighbor j ∈ N i can be outdated of ϕ j (k) ∈ N time instants. The maximum delay is assumed uniformly upper bounded.
Assumption 4 (Bounded maximum delay): The delays are uniformly upper bounded, i.e., sup k∈N max i∈N ϕ i (k) ≤ ϕ < ∞, for some ϕ ∈ N.
The dynamics describing the asynchronous update with delays can be then cast in a compact form as
is the vector of possibly delayed strategies. Note that each agent i has always access to the updated value of its strategy, i.e.,x i = x i , for all i ∈ N . We stress that the dynamics in (12) coincides with (11) when no delay is present, i.e., if ϕ = 0.
The following theorem claims the convergence (in probability) of (12) to an NWE of the game in (2), when the maximum delay ϕ is small enough.
Theorem 2 (Convergence of asynchronous dynamics):
Let Assumption 4 hold true, p min := min i∈N p i and
Then, for any x(0) ∈ Ω, the sequence (x(k)) k∈N generated by (12) converges almost surely to somex ∈ fix(prox f •A), namely, an NWE of the game in (2) .
If the maximum delay does not satisfy (13) , then the convergence of the dynamics in (12) is not guaranteed. In this case, convergence can be restored by introducing a time-varying scaling factor ψ k in the dynamics:
The introduction of this scaling factor, always smaller than 1, leads to a slower convergence of (14) with respect to (12) , since it implies a smaller step size in update. The next theorem proves that, the modified dynamics converges if the scaling factor is chosen small enough.
Theorem 3: Let Assumption 4 hold true and set
Then, for any x(0) ∈ Ω, the sequence (x(k)) k∈N generated by (14) converges almost surely to somex ∈ fix(prox f •A), namely, an NWE of the game in (2) .
C. Time-varying unconstrained dynamics
A challenging problem related to the dynamics in (7) is studying its convergence when the communication network is time-varying (i.e., the associated adjacency matrix A is time dependent). In this case, the update rules in (7) become
where A(k) = A(k) ⊗ I n and A(k) is the adjacency matrix at time instant k. Next, we assume persistent stochasticity of the sequence (A(k)) k∈N , that can be seen as the time-varying counterpart of Standing Assumption 3. Similar assumptions can be found in several other works over time-varying graphs, e.g., [26, Ass. 1], [2, Ass. 4, 5] , [10, Ass. 2, 3] .
Assumption 5 (Persistent row stochasticity and self-loops): For all k ∈ N, the adjacency matrix A(k) is row stochastic and describes a strongly connected graph. Furthermore, there exists k ∈ N such that, for all k > k, the matrix A(k)
The concept of NWE in Definition 1 is bound to the particular communication network considered. In the case of a time-varying communication topology, we focus on a different class of equilibria, namely, those invariant with respect to changes in the communication topology.
Next, we assume the existence of a p-NWE. Assumption 6 (Existence of a p-NWE): The set of p-NWE of (15) is non-empty, i.e., E = ∅.
We note that if the operators proxf 1 , proxf 2 , . . . , proxf N have at least one common fixed point, our convergence problem boils down to the setup studied in [27] . In this case, [27, Th. 2] can be applied to the dynamics in (15) to prove convergence to a p-NWE,x = 1 ⊗ x, wherex is a common fixed point of the proximal operators prox fi 's. However, if this additional assumption is not met, then convergence is not directly guaranteed. In fact, even though at each time instant the update in (15) describes converging dynamics, the convergence of the overall time-varying dynamics is not proven for every switching signal, see e.g. [28, Part II].
Since A(k) satisfies Standing Assumption 3 for all k, we can apply the same reasoning adopted in the proof of Theorem 1 to show that every mapping prox f • A(k) is AVG in a particular space H Q(k) , where in general Q(k) is different at different time instants. A priori, there is not a common space in which the AVG propriety holds for all the mappings, thus we cannot infer the convergence of the dynamics in (15) under arbitrary switching signals. In some particular cases, a common space can be found, e.g., if all the adjacency matrices are doubly stochastic, then the timevarying dynamics converge in the space H I , see [2, Th. 3] .
To address the more general case with row stochastic adjacency matrices, we propose modified dynamics with convergence guarantees to a p-NWE, for every switching sequence, i.e.,
These new dynamics are obtained by replacing A(k) in (15) 
is chosen as in Theorem 1. Remarkably, this key modification makes the resulting operators prox f • I + Q(k)(A(k) − I) k∈N averaged in the same space, i.e., H I , for all A(k) satisfying Assumption 3, as explained in Appendix C. Moreover, the change of dynamics does not lead to extra communications between the agents, since the matrix Q(k) is block diagonal.
The following theorem represents the main result of this section and shows that the modified dynamics in (17), subject to arbitrary switching of communication topology, converge to a p-NWE of the game in (15) , for any initial condition.
Theorem 4 (Convergence of time-varying dynamics): Let Assumptions 5, 6 hold true. Then, for any x(0) ∈ Ω, the sequence (x(k)) k∈N generated by (17) converges to a point x ∈ E, with E as in (16), namely, a p-NWE of (15) .
Proof: See Appendix C. We clarify that in general, the computation of Q(k) associated to each A(k) requires global information on the communication network. Therefore, this solution is suitable for the case of switching between a finite set of adjacency matrices, for which the associated matrices Q(k) can be computed offline.
Nevertheless, for some network structures the PF eigenvector is known or it can be explicitly computed locally. For example, if the matrix A(k) is symmetric, hence doublystochastic, or if each agent i knows the weight that its neighbours assign to the information he communicates, the i-the component of q(k) can be computed as lim t→∞ [A(k) ] t i x = q i (k), for any x ∈ R N [29, Prop. 1.68]. Moreover, if each agent i has the same out and in degree, denoted by d i (k), and the weights in the adjacency matrix are chosen as
In other words, in this case each agent must only know its out-degree to compute its component of q(k).
V. PROXIMAL DYNAMICS UNDER COUPLING CONSTRAINTS
A. Problem formulation
In this section, we consider a more general setup in which the agents in the game, not only are subject to local constraints, but also to M affine separable coupling constraints. Thus, let us consider the collective feasible decision set
where C ∈ R M ×nN and c ∈ R M . For every agent i ∈ N , the set of points satisfying the coupling constraints reads as
Standing Assumption 7: For all i ∈ N , the local feasible decision set Ω i ∩ X i (x −i ) satisfies Slater's condition.
The original game formulation in (2) changes to consider also the coupling constraints, i.e., ∀i ∈ N :
Hence the correspondent myopic dynamics read as
The concept of NWE (Definition 1) can be naturally extended for the case of network games with coupling constraints, as formalized next. Definition 3 (Generalized Network Equilibrium): A collective vector x is a generalized network equilibrium (GNWE) for the game in (20) if, for every i ∈ N ,
The following example shows that the dynamics in (3) fail to converge even for simple coupling constraints.
Example 2: Consider a 2-player game, defined as in (20), where, for i ∈ {1, 2}, x i ∈ R and the local feasible decision set is defined as
The game is jointly convex since the collective feasible decision set is described by the convex set X := {x ∈ R 2 | x 1 + x 2 = 0}. The parallel myopic best response dynamics are described in closed form as the discrete-time linear system:
which is not globally convergent, e.g., consider x 1 (0) = x 2 (0) = 1.
The myopic dynamics of the agents fail to converge, thus we rephrase them into some analogues pseudo-collaborative ones. In fact, the players aim to minimize their local cost function, while at the same time coordinate with the other agents to satisfy the coupling constraints. Toward this aim, we first dualize the problem and transform it in an auxiliary (extended) network game [30, Ch. 3] . Finally, we design a semi-decentralized iterative algorithm that ensure the convergence of these dynamics to a GNWE.
Let us now introduce the dual variable λ i ∈ R M ≥0 for each player i ∈ N , and define the concept of extended network equilibrium arising from this new problem structure.
Definition 4 (Extended Network Equilibrium): The pair (x, λ), is an Extended Network Equilibrium (ENWE) for the game in (20) if, for every i ∈ N , it satisfies
To find an ENWE of the game in (20) , we assume the presence of a central coordinator. It broadcasts to all agents an auxiliary variable σ that each agent i uses to compute its local dual variable λ i . Namely, every agent i applies a scaling factor α i ∈ [0, 1] to σ to attain its dual variable, i.e. λ i = α i σ. The values of the scaling factor represent a split of the burden that the agents experience to satisfy the constraints, hence N i=1 α i = 1. These game equilibrium problems were studied for the first time in the seminal work of Rosen [31] , where the author introduces the notion of normalized equilibrium. We specialize this equilibrium idea for the problem at hand, introducing the notion of normalized extended network equilibrium (n-ENWE).
Definition 5 (normalized-ENWE): The pair (x, σ), is a normalized-Extended Network Equilibrium (n-ENWE) for the game in (20) , if for all i ∈ N it satisfies
where α i > 0.
From (24a) -(24b), one can see that the class of n-ENWE is a particular instance of ENWE and, at the same time, a generalization of the case in which all the agents adopt the same dual variable, hence α i = 1/M , for all i ∈ N . This latter case is widely studied in literature, since describes a fair split between the agents of the burden to satisfy the constraints [32] , [33] .
Next, we recast the n-ENWE described by the two inclusions (24a) -(24b) as a fixed point of a suitable mappings. In fact, (24a) can be equivalently rewritten as
To combine in a single operator (24a) and (24b), we first introduce two mappings, i.e.,
and the affine mapping G :
The composition of these two operators provides a compact definition of n-ENWE for the game in (20) . In fact, a point (x, σ) is an n-ENWE if and only if col(x, σ) ∈ fix(R • G), indeed the explicit computation of R • G leads directly to (24a) and (24b).
The following lemmas show that an n-ENWE is also a GNWE by proving that a fixed point of R • G is a GNWE.
Lemma 2 (GNWE as fixed point): Let Assumption 7 hold true. Then, the following statements are equivalent:
(i) x is a GNWE for the game in (20);
Lemma 3 (Existence of a GNWE): Let Assumption 7 hold true. It always exists a GNWE for the game in (20) .
The two lemmas above are direct consequences of [2, Lem. 2, Prop. 2] respectively, so the proofs are omitted.
B. Algorithm derivation (Prox-GNWE)
In this section, we derive an iterative algorithm seeking n-GNWE (Prox-GNWE) for the game in (20) . The set of fixed points of the operator R • G can be expressed as the set of zeros of other suitable operators, as formalized next.
Several algorithms are available in the literature to find a zero of the sum of two monotone operators, the most common being presented in [17, Ch. 26] . We opted for a variant of the preconditioned proximal-point algorithm (PPP) that allows for non self-adjoint preconditioning [34, Eq. 4.18] . It results in proximal type update with inertia, that resemble the original myopic dynamics studied. The resulting algorithm is here called Prox-GNWE and it is described in (27a) -(27d) where, for all the variables introduced, we adopted the notation x + := x(k + 1) and x = x(k), for the sake of compactness. It is composed of three main steps: a local gradient descend (27a), done by each agent, a gradient ascend (27b), performed by the coordinator, and finally an inertia step (27c) -(27d).
The parameters Prox-GNWE are chosen such that the following inequalities are satisfied:
We note that, if γ is chosen small enough, then the right inequalities in (28) always hold. On the other hand, γ is the step size of the algorithm, thus a smaller value can affect the convergence speed. The formal derivation of these bounds is reported in Appendix D.
We also note that (27a) -(27d) require two communication between an agent i and its neighbours one to obtain the value of x j (k) in (27a) and the second to gatherx j (k) for all j ∈ N i in (27c). Finally, we conclude the section by establishing global convergence of the sequence generated by Prox-GNWE to a GNWE of the game in (20) .
Theorem 5 (Convergence Prox-GNWE): Set α i = q i , for all i ∈ N , with q i as in Theorem 1, and choose δ i , β, γ satisfying (28) . Then, for any initial condition, the sequence (x(k)) k∈N generated by (27a) -(27d), converges to a GNWE of the game in (20) .
Proof: See Appendix E. ∀i ∈ N :
VI. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS A. Synchronous/asynchronous Friedkin and Johnsen model
As mentioned in Section III, the problem studied in this paper arises often in the field of opinion dynamics. In this first simulation, we consider the standard Friedkin and Johnsen model, introduced in [35] . The strategy x i (k) of each player represents its opinion on n independent topics at time k. An opinion is represented with a value between 0 and 1, hence Ω i := [0, 1] n . The opinion [x i ] j = 1 if agent i completely agrees on topic j, and vice versa. Each agent is stubborn with respect to its initial opinion x i (0) and µ i ∈ [0, 1] defines how much its opinion is bound to it, e.g., if µ i = 0 the player is a follower on the other hand if µ i = 1 it is fully stubborn. In the following, we present the evolution of the synchronous and asynchronous dynamics (7) and (12), respectively, where the cost function is as in (4) .
We considered N = 10 agents discussing on n = 3 topics. The communication network and the weights that each agent assigns to the neighbours are randomly drawn, with the only constraint of satisfying Assumption 3. The initial condition is also a random vector x(0) ∈ [0, 1] nN . Half of the players are somehow stubborn µ = 0.5 and the remaining are more incline to follow the opinion of the others, i.e., µ = 0.1. For the asynchronous dynamics, we consider three scenarios. (A1) There is no delay in the information and the probability of update is uniform between the players, hence ϕ = 0 and p min = 1/N = 0.1. (A2) There is no delayed information and the update probability is defined accordingly to a random probability vector p, so ϕ = 0 and p min = 0.0191. In particular, we consider the case of a very skewed distribution to highlight the differences with respect to (A1) and (A3). (A3) We consider an uniform probability of update and a maximum delay of two time instants, i.e., p min = 1/N = 0.1 and ϕ = 2. The values of the maximum delay is chosen in order to fulfil condition (13) . (A4) In this case, we consider the same setup as in (A3) but in this case the maximum delay is ϕ = 50. Notice that the theoretical results do not guarantee the convergence of these dynamics. In Figure 1 it can be seen how the convergence of the synchronous dynamics and the asynchronous ones, in the conditions (A2), (A3), is similar. The delay affects the convergence speed if it surpass the theoretical upper bound in (13) , as in (A4). It is worthy to notice that, even a big delay, does not seem to lead to instability, while it can produce a sequence that does not converge monotonically to the Fig. 1 : Comparison between the convergence of the Friedkin and Johnsen model subject to synchronous and asynchronous update. In the latter case the different type of updates (A1), (A2), (A3) and (A4) are considered. For a fair comparison we have assumed that the synchronous dynamics update once every N time instants. equilibrium, see the zoom in Fig. 1 . The slowest convergence is obtained in the case of a non uniform probability of update, i.e., (A2). From the simulation it seems that the uniform update probability produces always the fastest convergence. In fact, the presence of agents updating with a low probability produces some plateau in the convergence of the dynamics.
B. Time-varying DeGroot model with bounded confidence
In this section, we consider a modified time varying version of the DeGroot model [19] , where each agent is willing to change its opinion up to a certain extent. This model can describe the presence of extremists in a discussion. In the DeGroot model, the cost function of the game in (2)f i , reduces tof i = ι Ωi for all i ∈ N . We consider N = 8 agents discussing on one topic, hence the state x i is a scalar. The agents belong to three different categories, that we call: positive extremists, negative extremists and neutralists. This classification is based on the local feasible decision set. (Ω i = [0, 0.25]). • Neutralists: the agents do not have a strong opinion on the topic, so their opinions vary from 0 to 1, i.e., Ω i = [0, 1]. Our setup is composed of two negative extremists (agent 1 and 2), four neutralists (agents 3-6) and two positive extremists (agents 6 and 8). We assume that, at each time instant, (17) can be rewritten, for a single agent i ∈ N , as
From this formulation, it is clear how the modification of the original dynamics (15) results into an inertia of the players to change their opinion.
We have proven numerically that Assumption 6 is satisfied and that the unique p-NWE of the game is In Figure 3 the evolution players' opinion are reported, as expected, the dynamics converge to the p-NWE, i.e.,x. 
C. Distributed LASSO algorithm
The following simulation applies Prox-GNWE to solve a problem of distributed model fitting. Namely, we develop a distributed implementation of the LASSO algorithm.
First, we introduce the problem by describing the classical centralized formulation, for a complete description see [21] . Consider a large number of dataỹ ∈ R d , where d = 500, affected by an additive normal Gaussian noise; the true model that generates them is assumed linear and in the form Bx = y, where B ∈ R d×n is the covariate matrix; x ∈ R n the real parameters of the model, with n = 6; and y the model outputs not affected by the noise. Hereafter, the matrix B is assumed to be known. The algorithm aims to compute the parameters estimationx ∈ R n that minimizes the cost function f (x) := Bx −ỹ 2 2 + x 1 . We focus now on the distributed counterpart of the LASSO, already analized in the literature, e.g., see [36] . In our setup, we assume N = 5 agents, each one measuring a subsetỹ i ∈ R 100 ofỹ, and communicating via a network described by the adjacency matrix A, satisfying Standing Assumption 3. Accordingly, each agent i knows the local covariate matrix B i ∈ R 200×6 associated to the measurementsỹ i ∈ R 200 . The noise affecting the data set of each agent i, is assumed Gaussian with zero mean and variance σ i . It models the different precision of each agent in measuring the data. The variance σ i is randomly drawn between [0, σ M ]. In the following, we propose simulations for four different values of σ M , namely 0.5%, 1.25%, 2.5% and 5% of the maximum value of y, i.e., the values of σ M := {1.13, 2.8, 5.6, 11.3}.
We cast the problem as the game in (20) , where, for all agent i ∈ N , the local cost function is f i (x i ) := B ixi − y i 2 2 + x i 1 , wherex i is the local estimation of the model parameters. On he other hand, letx = col((x i ) i∈N ), then the aggregative term x i − Ax 2 leads to a better fit of the model, if the weights in the matrix A are chosen inversely proportional to the noise variance of each agent. To enforce the consensus between all the local estimationsx i , i.e.,x * := x i (∞) for all i ∈ N , we impose the constraint Lx = 0, where L := L ⊗ I n and L is the Laplacian matrix associated to the communication network. The resulting game can be solved via Prox-GNWE, that provides a distributed version of the LASSO algorithm. In particular, it generates a sequence (x(k)) k∈N converging asymptotically to a solution of the model fitting problem.
In Figure 4 , it is shown the trajectory of x(k+1)−x(k)
x(k+1)
wherex(k) is the collective vectors of the parameters estimations obtained via Prox-GNWE at iteration k; this quantity describes the relative variation of the estimations between two iterations of the algorithms. Notice that the sequence converges asymptotically, but, as expected, a greater noise variance σ M leads to a slower rate of convergence. The x(k+1) generated via Prox-GNWE. The different maximum noise variances σ M adopted identify the different curves. constraint violation, i.e., Lx(k) , at every iteration k of the algorithm are reported in Figure 5 ; the constraints fulfilment is achieved asymptotically. Also in this case, the use of more noisy measurementsỹ leads to a slower asymptotic convergence of the local estimationsx i to consensus. Figure 6 , we report the normalized MSE for different values of σ M . The increment of σ M causes a slower decrement of the MSE, i.e., a higher number of iterations to achieve a good parameters estimations. On the other hand, if a small noise affect the data, already after 1000 iterations the parameters obtained perform almost as good as the final ones. The study of this curves emphasises the trade off between a good parameters estimations and a fast converging algorithm. Fig. 6 : Trajectory of the normalized average MSE of the estimated model with respect to the real one, for every iteration k ∈ N. The different maximum noise variances σ M adopted identify the different curves.
VII. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK A. Conclusion
For the class of multi-agent games, proximal type dynamics converge, provided that they are subject only to local constraints and the communication network is strongly connected. We proved that their asynchronous counterparts also converge, and that they are robust to bounded delayed information. If each agent has the possibility to arbitrarily choose the communications weights with its neighbours, then proximal dynamics converge even if the communication network varies over time. For multi-agent games subject to both local and coupling constraints, the proximal type dynamics fail to converge, so we provide a converging iterative algorithm (Prox-GNWE) converging to a normalized-Extended Network Equilibrium of the game. When the problem at hand can be recast as a proximal type dynamics, the results achieved directly provide the solution of the game, as shown in the numerical examples proposed.
B. Outlook
Although we have analyzed several different setups, this topic still presents unsolved issues that can be explored in future research. In the following, we highlight the ones that we think are the most compelling.
The implementation of the asynchronous version of Prox-GNWE presents several technical issues. In fact, the operator in (43), describing the synchronous dynamics, is quasi-NE. This is a weaker property than NE, thus it does not allow us to extend the approach used in Section IV-B to create the asynchronous version of the constrained dynamics, see [25, Th. 1] . In the literature, there are no asynchronous algorithms providing convergence for quasi-NE operators, that translate to implementable iterative algorithms, thus an ad hoc solution has to be developed. It is interesting to notice, that in the particular case in which the game is an ordinal potential game, we can easily show that the asynchronous constrained dynamics converge asymptotically.
In the case of a time-varying graph, see Section IV-C, we have supposed that at every time instant the communication networks satisfies Standing Assumption 3. It can be interesting to weak this assumption by considering jointly connected communication networks, as done in [27] .
One can notice that, if the adjacency matrix is irreducible, then it is also AVG in some weighted space, see [37, Prop. 1] . The characterization of this space may lead to an extension of the results presented in this paper, as long as the matrix weighting the space preserves the distributed nature of the dynamics.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1
Firstly, we introduce the following auxiliary lemma.
Lemma 5: Let P ∈ R N ×N , [P ] ij := p ij be a non negative matrix that satisfies
where q ∈ R N >0 . Then P is NE in H Q , with Q = diag(q). Proof: To ease the notation we adopt j (·) := j∈N (·) and j k<j (·) := j∈N k∈(1,...,j−1) (·) in the following.
Next, we exploit (31) to compute
Notice that for all i ∈ N it holds
furthermore this implies that
Since the matrix P is supposed non negative and from (32) and (33) , it follows that
Proof of Lemma 1
(i) From Standing Assumption 3, A is marginally stable, with no eigenvalues on the boundary of the unit disk but semisimple eigenvalues at 1. It can be rewrite as A = (1 − η)Id + ηB with η > 1 − a, hence B ≥ 0 and is row stochastic. The graph associated to B has the same edges of the one of A, so it is strongly connected and consequently B is irreducible. The PF theorem for irreducible matrix ensures the existence of a vector q satisfying (31) for B. Therefore, Lemma 5 can be applied to B, implying that B is NE in H Q where Q = diag(q) 0. By construction, this implies that the linear operator A is η-AVG in the same space. This directly implies that A = A⊗I n is η-AVG in H Q , with Q = Q⊗I n .
(ii) From point (i), we know that A is η-AVG in the space H Q . Define q i := [Q] ii , since prox fi is FNE in H In , it holds that for all x, y ∈ R n and for all i ∈ N ,
Grouping together (34) , for every the i ∈ N , leads to
for all x, y ∈ R nN , hence prox f (·) is FNE in H Q . Thus, by [38, Prop. 2.4] , the composition prox f • A is AVG in H Q with constant 1 2−η . Finally, if the matrix A is doubly stochastic, then its left PF eigenvector is 1. Applying the result just attained in (ii), we conclude that prox f • A is η-AVG in H I .
Proof of Theorem 1
From Lemma 1(ii), we know that the operator prox f •A is AVG in H Q with constant 1 2−η and η > 1 − a. Therefore the convergence proof of the Banach iteration in (7) is completed invoking [24, Prop. 5.14] .
Proof of Corollary 1
The convergence follows directly from [24, Prop. 5.15] and the fact that the considered A is nonexpansive in the space H Q , by Lemma 5.
B. Proof of Section IV-B
Since dynamics (14) are a particular case to the ones in (12) , we first prove Theorem 3 and successively derive the proof of Theorem 2 exploiting a similar reasoning.
Proof of Theorem 3
From Theorem 1, we know that the operator T := prox f • A is η-AVG in the space H Q with η ∈ (1 − a, 1). Therefore, it can be written as T = (1−η)Id+ηT where T is a suitable NE operator in H Q . Notice that fix(T ) = fix(T ). Substituting this formulation of T in (14) leads to
Since T is NE in H Q , [25, Lemma 13 and 14] can be applied to the dynamics in (36) . Therefore, if we chose ψ k ∈ 0, N pmin (2ϕ √ pmin+1)(1−a) , the sequence generated by the dynamics in (36) are bounded and converge almost surely to a point x ∈ fix(T ) = fix(prox f • A). The proof is completeds recalling that the set of fixed points of prox f • A coincides with the one of NWE, Remark 1.
Proof of Theorem 2
The dynamics (12) coincide with (14) , when ψ k = 1 for all k ∈ N, therefore if N pmin (2ϕ √ pmin+1)(1−a) > 1, then the convergence is guaranteed from Theorem 3. From easy computation it can be seen that this condition is equivalent to (13) , and this conclude the proof.
C. Proofs of Section IV-C
Before presenting the proof of Theorem 4, let us introduce two preliminary lemmas. The first proposes a transformation to construct a doubly stochastic matrix from a general row stochastic matrix. 
where 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1 max i∈N (1−pii)wi , is non negative and doubly stochastic. If µ < 1 max i∈N (1−pii)wi , then the diagonal elements of P are positive.
Proof: Since w is a left eigenvector of P it holds that
In order to prove the first part of the lemma we have to show that P 1 = 1 and 1 P = 1 , hence
Analogously,
where the last equality is achieved by means of (38) . Therefore, from (39)- (40) we conclude that P is doubly stochastic. The diagonal elements of P are p ii := 1 − µw i + µw i p ii the off diagonal ones are instead p ij := µw i p ij , ∀i, j ∈ N . From simple calculations, it follows that if 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1 max i∈N (1−pii)wi then P is a non negative matrix.
If µ < 1 max i∈N (1−pii)wi then p ii > 0 for all i ∈ N , hence P is doubly stochastic and with positive diagonal elements.
In the next corollary we consider the case of a matrix A satisfying Standing Assumption 3. It shows that the transformation (37) does not change the set of fixed points of A. Furthermore, it also provides the coefficient of averagedness of A. 
is doubly stochastic with self-loops and the following statements hold:
(i) fix(A·) = fix(A·); (ii) A satisfies Standing Assumption 3;
Proof: (i) The definition in (41) is equivalent to A = (I − Q) + QA. Therefore fix(A) = fix(A), since Q 0.
(ii) The matrix A is in the form of (37) with µ = 1 and, since 1 < 1 max i∈N (1−ai,i(k)) ≤ 1 max i∈N (1−ai,i(k))qi , it satisfies the assumption of Lemma 6, thus A is doubly stochastic with self-loops. Finally, since A satisfies Standing Assumption 3, the graph defined by A is also strongly connected, therefore also A satisfies Standing Assumption 3.
, we can also apply [2, Lem. 9] or use the same argument as in the proof of Lemma 1.
Proof of Theorem 4
From Corollary 7, each matrix A : [38, Prop. 2.4] . All the operators used in the dynamics are AVG in the same space H I , therefore the global convergence follows from [38, Prop. 3.4(iii) ], since all the cluster point of (x(k)) k∈N lay in E.
D. Derivation of Prox-GNWE
Here, we propose the complete derivation of Prox-GNWE. To ease the notation, we define A := B + Id − G, := col(x(k), σ(k)) and + := col(x(k + 1), σ(k + 1)). Consider the following non symmetric preconditioning matrix
The update rule of the modified PPP algorithm [34, Eq. 4.18] , reads as˜
Let us define its self-adjoint and skew symmetric components as U := (Φ + Φ )/2 and S := (Φ − Φ )/2. We choose the parameters δ and β to ensure that U 0 and U ≤ γ −1 , where γ will be the step-size of the algorithm. This can be done through the Gerschgorin Circle Theorem [39, Th. 2] . The resulting bounds are reported in (28) . Next, we proceed to compute the explicit formulation of the algorithm. First, we focus on (43a) , sõ
Solving the first row block of (44d), i.e. 0
with a slight abuse of notation let us define
The second row block instead reads as 0 ∈ C(
The final formulation of Prox-GNWE, presented in (27a) -(27d), is obtained combining (45) and (46b) with (43b).
E. Convergence proof of Prox-GNWE
Also in this case, we first propose an auxiliary lemma. Lemma 8: Let Λ = Q with Q is chosen in accordance with Theorem 1. Then the mapping Id − G from (26) is maximally monotone in H Q where Q = diag(Q, I M ).
Proof: The mapping Id − G is monotone if and only if 2Q − (G Q + QG) 0 (by [40, Lemma 3] ). 
